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Abstract: Scientific discussions have emphasized that the main problem with the current deposit
insurance system is that the current system does not evaluate the risks that banks assume to calculate
the deposit insurance premiums in many countries of the European Union (E.U.). Thus, the prevailing
system does not safeguard a sufficient level of stability in the banking system. Scientific studies show
that the deposit insurance system should consider not only the risk indicators for individual banks,
but it must also consider the systemic risk of banks that affects the stability of the banking system.
Hence, the question arises as to whether measurements of systemic risk in a common E.U. risk-based
deposit insurance system are a formal necessity or if they are a value-adding process. Expanding
the discussion of scientists, this article analyzes how contributions to insurance funds would change
the banks of Lithuania following the introduction of the E.U.’s overall risk-based deposit insurance
system and after taking into consideration the additional systemic risk. The research results that
were obtained provide evidence that the introduction of a risk-based deposit insurance system would
redistribute payments to the deposit insurance fund between banks operating in Lithuania, and,
thereby, would contribute to a reduction in the negative effects of the deposit insurance system and
would improve the stability in the financial system.
Keywords: risk-based; systemic risk; deposit insurance
1. Introduction
One of the major ways in which banks raise funds is through deposit-taking. The importance of
this activity for banks is undeniable, and the major effective principles of a deposit insurance system
have been defined by the Bank for International Settlements (Bank for International Settlements 2014).
In June 2009, the Bank for International Settlements and the Basel Committee presented the main
principles for an effective deposit insurance system for the first time, which have been subsequently
updated every few years. The basic functions and objectives of deposit insurance are to protect
consumers and to improve the stability of the financial markets that are provided for in European
Directive 94/19/EC due to guarantee schemes (Gerhardt and Lannoo 2011). The efficiency of a
deposit insurance system depends on three factors, which are: The macro-economic environment of
the financial system’s structure, the regulation of risk restriction and supervision, and the legal and
judicial systems as well as the accounting and disclosure systems. So, identically designed deposit
insurance systems may not have the same effects on the financial system’s stability and the protection
of depositors due to differences in the environment under which they operate. A deposit insurance
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system not only contributes to the protection of depositors, it also affects the decisions that their own
bank makes and the whole banking system (Andries and Nistor 2016; Allen et al. 2011; Ellis 2013;
Enkhbold and Otgonshar 2013; Gómez-Fernández-Aguado et al. 2014; Ioannidou and Penas 2010;
Prean and Stix 2011). The global financial crisis, which has disclosed the instability of the banking
system, has shown that the main problems that are associated with the banking business are the extent
of the risks that banks assume and the small volume of insurance that is available to their customers
and depositors. An important aspect of a deposit insurance system is to have the deposit insurance
fund be of an optimal size, since the financing of a deposit insurance system is different in European
Union (E.U.) countries.
Scientific discussions (Bernet and Walter 2009; Gerhardt and Lannoo 2011;
Gómez-Fernández-Aguado and Partal-Ureña 2013) that have been conducted previously cover the
main types of financing for deposit insurance systems that are prevalent, such as ex-ante, ex-post,
and mixed, because all of the deposit insurance contributions that are made up until the occurrence
of the insured event are valid in 13 E.U. countries, which is based on the regular collection of
contributions to the fund. The main advantage of this type of financing is that all of the contributions
that are collected from the members, including the poorly managed banks, can be used immediately in
the event of financial instability (Gerhardt and Lannoo 2011).
Upon analyzing the peculiarities of the deposit insurance system, and focusing on certain forms of
the importance of deposit insurance, it has been found that this is valid for modern banking systems
around the world. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2014) and Gerhardt and Lannoo (2011), conducting research on
implicit and explicit deposit insurance systems, have found that that an implicit deposit insurance system
has a positive impact on the entire financial system. On the other hand, Altunb and Thornton (2013)
have opined that the usage of an explicit deposit insurance system increases the level of private capital
inflows, which, in turn, determines that countries with an explicit deposit insurance system are more
attractive to depositors and investors due to the anticipated additional security measures that banks will
take because of the deposit insurance that will enable them to provide higher returns. The importance
of the implicit system has also been highlighted by Boyle et al. (2015), who stated that the respondents
from countries that were faced with a hypothetical bank collapse, where there was no explicit deposit
insurance system in place, would withdraw a higher proportion of their funds from the insured accounts
and would be required to pay higher interest rates for these accounts than those respondents whose
countries had in place an explicit deposit insurance system. The influence of an explicit deposit insurance
system on the banking crises largely depends on the overall economic development of the country, since
the deposit insurance system in less-developed countries would interact with the country’s economic
development, and, thereby, would create higher probabilities of banking crises (Khan and Dewan 2011).
However, almost all of the countries in Europe have an explicit deposit insurance system in place, which
typically insures deposits up to the statutory limit of compensation. Therefore, it is necessary to look
for opportunities that would ensure financial stability in countries that are less developed in terms of
the economy.
In most member states of the E.U., and in the countries of the European Economic Area, the same
deposit insurance rates are valid. However, it is often observed that countries issue guarantees that
exceed the pre-determined limits during banking crises (Cannas et al. 2014). The deposit insurance
systems that are valid in the E.U. provide insufficient protection for depositors, since contributions are
not based on a risk assessment of the banks, which means that one of the basic functions of deposit
insurance is not considered. Therefore, the E.U. has attempted to create a common deposit insurance
system, based on an assessment of the risk that banks assume, for several years now. Since 2008,
the European Commission has presented three different deposit insurance systems, the latest of which
was introduced only in the middle of 2015. Scientific discussions (Acharya et al. 2011; Andries and
Nistor 2016; Brownlees and Engle 2011; De Jonghe et al. 2015; Laeven et al. 2014, 2016; Londono and
Tian 2014; Mensah and Premaratne 2017; Oordt and Zhou 2015) have focused their attention on the
fact that the system that prevails in many E.U. countries does not evaluate the risks that banks assume
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to calculate the deposit insurance premiums. Therefore, the present system does not provide sufficient
stability to the banking system, while contributing to the systemic growth of risk among banks through
the increasing number of links among banks and the banking integration interface.
Systemic risk is especially important in today’s financial system, where there is significant banking
interdependence, and regulatory authorities can no longer afford to deal with, and focus only on, the
risk that an individual bank faces. Therefore, researchers emphasize analyzing the deposit insurance
system and evaluating systemic risk to create an effective deposit insurance system (Acharya et al. 2010;
Allen and Tang 2016; Laeven et al. 2016; Lee et al. 2015). According to Acharya et al. (2010), an effective
assessment of deposit insurance premiums would include an evaluation of systemic risk, which would
essentially justify the need for deposit insurance. Leur et al. (2017) observed that the global financial
crisis of 2008, and the later debt crisis in the European countries, determined the continuing interest in
spreading systemic risk across the institutions that constitute the financial system. Thus, the ambition
of the E.U. to develop and implement a unified risk-based deposit insurance system through the
scientific research that demonstrates the importance of systemic risk shows the gravity of the problem
and highlights this research’s practical significance. However, it is necessary to consider whether
measurements of systemic risk in a common European Union risk-based deposit insurance system are
a formal necessity or if they are a value-adding process. In answering this question, and contributing
to the ongoing scientific debate on what impact the collection of contributions would have on the
introduction of a common E.U. risk-assessment-based deposit insurance system and the systemic risk
assessment, this study aims to determine how contributions to the insurance fund of banks that operate
in Lithuania would change after the introduction of a general E.U. risk-based deposit insurance system,
in addition to performing a systemic risk assessment of the system.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 1 presents a literature review.
Section 2 goes on to present the methodology that is employed to conduct the research. Section 3 reflects
on the impact that banks that operate in Lithuania would face due to the introduction of a common
E.U. risk-assessment-based deposit insurance system that is in accordance with the methodology that
is presented in the European Banking Authority’s guidelines (Model 1). It will additionally assess
the systemic risk with the main indicators of risk that are presented in (Model 2). The final section
presents the conclusions that have been drawn through the research.
2. Literature Review
To equalize differences in the deposit insurance system and to improve its effectiveness, the European
Commission has, since 2008, been aiming to create a common European Union risk-based deposit insurance
system. The year 2008 saw the launch of three deposit insurance system models, starting with the extremely
flexible and easily adaptable single indicator system (Single Indicator Model) (European Commission 2009),
then assigning minimum weights for certain risk categories and key risk indicators (Multiple Indicators
Model) (European Commission 2009), and finally establishing an aggregate risk weight (ARW)
(EBA Guidelines 2015). The first two risk-based deposit insurance methods differ from one another
in terms of the determination of the risk profiles of banks, the selection of risk indicators that define the
risk profile the best, and the summation method, which is used to connect all of the risk indicators into
a single index that shows the overall risk profile of the bank (Galliani et al. 2012). In the most recent
deposit insurance premium calculation guidelines (EBA Guidelines 2015), minimal weight requirements
for risk categories are provided for banks, and five risk categories have been evaluated to identify
the key risk indicators, where, in each of the five categories, one or two risk indicators are evaluated
(EBA Guidelines 2015). According to Gómez-Fernández-Aguado and Partal-Ureña (2013), the creation of
a risk-based deposit insurance system would contribute to the more credible management of banks and
would reduce the number of contributions that go towards less risky banks. Following up on their research,
Gómez-Fernández-Aguado et al. (2014) think that it is necessary to include additional risk measures to
evaluate the deposit insurance premiums, which would enable banks to be managed better. It would
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also lead to the regulation of the E.U.’s market discipline, leading to an improvement in the stability of
the banks.
However, studies that various authors have conducted have shown that it is necessary to
evaluate not only the main categories of risk, but also the level of systemic risk (Allen and Tang 2016;
Acharya et al. 2010; Laeven et al. 2016; Frey and Hledik 2018; Lee et al. 2015). Allen and Tang (2016)
state that systemic risk is externally generated in the global macroeconomics of financial institutions
with the help of extreme tail risks that work individually. According to the authors, systemic risk
needs to be managed in financial institutions of all types and sizes; i.e., it is necessary to measure each
individual contribution of a bank to manage the global systemic risk (Allen and Tang 2016). Although
the model that the European Commission presented in 2015 is more complex and involves assessing
risks to a greater extent, it still does not consider one of the most important assessments: That of
the existence of systemic risk. Thus, the model should be extended to include the assessment of this
risk in the calculation of deposit insurance premiums (Acharya et al. 2011; Brownlees and Engle 2011;
Gómez-Fernández-Aguado et al. 2014; Lakstutiene et al. 2017; Lee et al. 2015; Londono and Tian
2014; Oordt and Zhou 2015; Varotto and Zhao 2014). These scientific discussions intensified in
2009 as Bernet and Walter noted that the deposit insurance system should be evaluated using four
different categories of bank risk by extending one of the indicator models, wherein each category
would have a certain contribution rate, and the calculated contribution should be multiplied by a
systemic risk coefficient (Bernet and Walter 2009). Since systemic risk stems from external coefficients,
when one financial institution’s failure to discharge its obligations causes negative effects on other
institutions and the economy, the determination of deposit insurance premiums, including a systemic
risk assessment, would justify the importance of the deposit insurance system (Acharya et al. 2010).
This view has also been shared by Lee et al. (2015), who found that deposit insurance based on
contribution rates with systemic risk can mitigate any distortions that are present in the financial
system. However, according to the European directives, there is no requirement to evaluate and analyze
potential sources of systemic risk, which could lead credit institutions to produce greater systemic risk
and raise the number of negative changes that occur in the overall system. Therefore, according to
Gómez-Fernández-Aguado et al. (2014), E.U. authorities should consider possible changes, including
the evaluation of systemic risk in the deposit insurance funding schemes, because it has been observed
that a variety of issues that are related to deposit insurance systems have been addressed during the
financial crises. Kuzubas et al. (2016) also stress that the global financial crisis in 2008 drew attention to
the importance of the non-compliance of the systemic effects of banks and to systemic risk reduction,
because in an inter-bank network, idiosyncratic shocks affect the stability of the entire system.
The global financial crisis of 2008 has revealed the huge impact that global financial stability faces
due to excessive risk-taking by banks, especially considering the underestimated and unregulated
systemic consequences of risk-taking (Battaglia and Gallo 2017). Anginer et al. (2014) determined that,
although financial safety nets increase the risk that banks face and the fragility of systemic banking,
both individual bank risk as well as systemic risk have been lower in countries during the global
financial crisis that have had a deposit insurance system in place. Brownlees and Engle (2011, 2017),
assessing the systemic risk, recommend that the capital of the bank be calculated, something that the
bank will require when the financial crisis begins, and Acharya et al. (2011) offers to assess systemic
risk as the insufficient capital of a separate bank if the whole system is facing a capital failure.
It should be noted that the systemic risk level often is related to the size of the bank.
De Jonghe et al. (2015) observe that banks have become larger and more diversified over the past
two decades. However, the global financial crisis showed the negative side of this increase in size and
diversification: Larger banks have a higher tail risk, and diversification determines higher systemic
risk (De Jonghe et al. 2015). The size of a bank has also been highlighted by Black et al. (2016), who
evaluate systemic risk as the distress insurance premium (DIP), which combines features such as the
size of the bank and the probability of default. Therefore, the lack of a systemic risk assessment is
especially important for large banks that often pay lower deposit insurance premiums than small
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banks (Lee et al. 2015). Laeven et al. (2014) agree with such an opinion, and say that the big banks
are riskier and create more systemic risk since they have less capital and less stable funding than
small banks. However, scientists claim that the current amount of banking regulation, when the risk
of each bank is assessed, may be insufficient for large banks, because the risk that big banks face is
not greater than that of the smaller banks even if we evaluate the big banks separately. Therefore,
they should be subject to further regulation, and systemic risk should be assessed using the expected
capital shortfall of a financial subject conditional on a prolonged market decline—SRISK indicator
(Laeven et al. 2014). The impact of government and the importance of regulation are emphasized by
Andries and Nistor (2016), who evaluate systemic risk through the risk that each individual bank faces
and the systemic contribution using the Value at Risk (VaR) methodology, and then go on to analyze
the impact of government and that of the regulatory system on each bank and their contribution
towards systemic risk and individual risk. In later studies, Laeven et al. (2016) used the CoVar and
SRISK systemic risk assessment methods to confirm the findings of previous studies, which state that
systemic risk increases with the size of a bank, i.e., the bigger the bank, the more systemic risk it has.
Scientists contributing to the debate on the methods that are to be used to assess systemic
risk complement each other’s research, modifying research methods and adjusting assumptions.
Brownlees and Engle (2011, 2017) developed a simulation environment that allows us to determine a
collision with capital shortfalls in the overall system. Varotto and Zhao (2014), applying a very similar
approach to that of Brownlees and Engle (2011), measured the limit of discharge of the obligations
of a bank with a systemic risk indicator, which identifies the moment when the assets of the bank
would be less than the bank’s debt in a future period. De Souza et al. (2016) measure systemic risk
through the DebtRank method, and they seek to determine an additional stress in the financial system
due to external shocks in one or more financial institutions. Oordt and Zhou (2015) assessment of
systemic risk is based on a market analysis, and systemic risk has been assessed as the sensitivity
of the bank’s returns on the share price to very large adverse shocks in the financial system. This
method is based on the returns from the stock prices and market capitalization, and it can be applied
to the shares of all banks that are publicly traded on the stock exchange. Note that the reliability and
the results of most models that have been applied depend on the ability of the participants of the
financial market to assess the financial risk, which is based on financial market data, and the required
information in certain models, which is provided only in the internal environment of the banks. Thus,
some models are applied with restrictions. The scientific research and discussion that assesses the
general E.U. risk-assessment-based deposit insurance system’s design and the implementation of
systemic risk assessment raise many questions that can be answered only by expanding the range
of research in the following ways: Analyzing scientific research, combining and adapting different
methods, and performing research according to a country-specific model.
3. Study Data and Methodology
On 25 May 2015, the European Banking Authority presented guidelines for new premium calculation
methodologies of deposit guarantee schemes (European Parliament and Council Directive 2014), and the
European Parliament’s directive was adopted for the creation of a new deposit guarantee system.
According to the new default resolutions, contributions to the deposit insurance system should be based
on the amount of insured deposits and the corresponding degree of risk that each participant in the
system incurs. It is stated that such a system for calculating the contributions of deposit guarantees
reduces the occurrence of moral hazards in banks. Under this deposit insurance scheme, participating
institutions may foresee lower contributions to lower-risk sectors, which are managed by national law
(European Parliament and Council Directive 2014).
According to the guidelines of the European Banking Institution, the annual contributions to the
Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS), with respect to each authority of the state, are calculated using the
equation given below:
Ci = CR × ARWi × CDi × µ (1)
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where Ci is the annual contribution of the participating institution; CR is the contribution rate
(which is the same across all state institutions in a given year); ARWi is the aggregate risk weight of
the participating institution; CDi is the volume of insured deposits of the participating institution;
and µ is the adjustment coefficient (which is the same across all state institutions in a given year)
(EBA Guidelines 2015).
Calculation of the deposit insurance fund’s annual target amount and the contribution rate (CR)
each year should be based on a number of assumptions: (1) DGS that started to collect deposit insurance
premiums before the occurrence of the insured event (ex-ante) have to reach the target size of the
deposit guarantee system of their institutions’ members in 10 years; (2) contributions to the DGS must
be spread across the 10 years as evenly as possible; and (3) the annually collected contributions must
be equal to the annual target level of the premiums fixed for the given year (EBA Guidelines 2015).
The adjustment coefficient should be used to ensure that all annual contributions (the total amount of
all contributions) is 1/10th of the targeted level.
Calculation of the aggregate risk weight (ARW) of each participating institution should be
calculated individually and based on the evaluation of various risk indicators, including capital, asset
quality, liquidity and funding, business management and model, as well as the potential loss on the
deposit guarantee due to system risk categories. The minimum ARW rate should fluctuate between
50% and 75%, while the maximum ARW rate should be fixed between 150% and 200%. A wider range
can be determined only for important reasons. Without the main risk indicators, the deposit guarantee
system may include additional risk indicators that are important to a determination on the risk profile
of each of the members of the participating institutions. The amount of weight that is assigned to all
risk indicators in the premium calculation deposit guarantee system model must be equal to 100%.
While allocating individual risk weights, the minimum weight requirements for risk categories and
key risk indicators are given. The DGS should allocate the remaining 25% between the identified risk
categories, assigning them to additional risk indicators and/or increasing the minimum weights for
the main risk indicators. However, the distribution of the remaining 25% is also subject to several
requirements. If only key risk indicators are used, then the remaining 25% is to be allocated strictly
between risk categories (24% for capital, 24% for liquidity and funding, 18% for asset quality, 17% for
business model and management, and 17% for potential losses due to the DGS).
It should be noted that a determination of the minimum amount of contribution should take
proper care of the inevitable moral hazard assessment when determining the flat-rate payments and
assess the potential risks of barriers to service access in the banking sector. Contributions to the
DGS may be reduced if a member state participates in the institutional guarantee system, which
is separate from the DGS. This choice was intended to acknowledge patterns that would protect a
credit institution by ensuring its liquidity and solvency. If a member state, which is also a member
of a separate institutional safeguards system, makes use of such an option, the value of the common
risk coefficient (ARW) may be reduced, considering the additional protection that the institutional
guarantee system provides. In this case, a reduction in the contribution can be carried out by adding
additional risk indicators that are associated with membership in the institutional guarantee system
or including it into the risk category of Business model and management. The membership rate
of the Institutional Guarantee System should reflect the additional solvency and liquidity, which is
additionally provided to each member (EBA Guidelines 2015). The weight of each additional risk
indicator, or the weight increase of the main indicator of risk, should not be greater than 15%, with
the exception of additional qualitative indicators that are related to the results of a comprehensive
assessment of the risk profile and management of the member institution. Additionally, minimal
weights, which are specified for risk category, should be maintained by moving weights on to other
indicators that are in the same risk group if at least one of the main indicators is not used.
The aggregate risk weight (ARW) in each participating institution must be assessed individually
and be based on the evaluation of various risk indicators from each of the risk categories. It is
emphasized that the calculation of the contributions to deposit guarantee systems is only one of the
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possible models, because each member state can develop its own premium calculation model and
submit that for approval. A common deposit insurance system should help to unify the deposit
insurance systems in all E.U. countries, and contribute to a reduction in the moral hazard risk and
an enhancement in the stability of the overall financial system. This proves, once again, that the
development of a common E.U. deposit insurance system, which had started from the creation of
a simple single index model and then moved on to the inclusion of several risk indicators, laid the
foundation for the calculation of a risk-based deposit insurance premium. In 2015, the risk evaluation
included one additional group of risk indicators, and some of the replacement risk indicators produced
conditions suitable for the creation of an aggregate risk weight assessment model, which is free to
deal with the possibilities of systemic risk and to provide critical assessments. Although the latest
model for the calculation of E.U. deposit insurance premiums should be able to assess the risks that
banks take more accurately, it still cannot estimate one of the most important risks, i.e., the size of the
systemic risk in banks.
The question of whether it is necessary for the E.U. to have a common risk-based deposit insurance
system is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, there has not yet been a decision on what
kind of bank risks must be evaluated to calculate risk-based deposit insurance premiums. Therefore,
we perform a risk assessment on banks operating in Lithuania to determine how premiums would
change these banks after the introduction of the common E.U. risk-based deposit insurance system.
Two models have been presented in the research. In the first model (Model 1), only those key risk
indicators presented in the European Banking Authority’s guidelines are evaluated (EBA Guidelines 2015).
In the second model (Model 2), systemic risk is further assessed with the main risk indicators
presented in References (Acharya et al. 2011; Andries and Nistor 2016; Brownlees and Engle 2011, 2017;
De Jonghe et al. 2015; Laeven et al. 2014, 2016; Londono and Tian 2014; Oordt and Zhou 2015;
Varotto and Zhao 2014). The study has determined the risk groups that the banks operating in Lithuania
fall into in terms of systemic risk. We consider the influence that a systemic risk assessment would have
on the contributions of the banks that operate in Lithuania, and whether the inclusion of systemic risk
is a value-adding process in a common European Union deposit insurance system. Systemic risk and
risk-based deposit insurance premiums are important topics in the Lithuanian banking system, as in
2012–2013 two of its banks became bankrupt. The collected deposit insurance premiums were not enough
to cover the deposit insurance for the depositors, and the Lithuanian state had to contribute to the deposit
insurance coverage.
At present, Lithuania operates 13 different banks and branch offices. Most branches are engaged
in investment banking, but only six banks are registered in Lithuania. The calculation of deposit
insurance premiums requires specific internal data, which can only be found in a bank’s financial
reports and explanatory notes. So, the research shows results using data from Lithuanian banks, but
the research methodology could be used in other European Union member states. The study assessed
all of the banks that are registered in Lithuania, which are: JSC SEB Bank, JSC Swedbank, JSC DNB
Bank, JSC Siauliu Bank, JSC Citadele Bank, and PLLC Medicinos Bank. To perform calculations of
the individual risk parameters for each bank, data has been collected from all banks operating in
Lithuania from collections of financial reports for the years between 2012 and 2016. A detailed risk
assessment of the banks operating in Lithuania, using the European Banking Authority’s method
(EBA Guidelines 2015), has been done by Lakstutiene and Barkauskaite (2018) by calculating and
analyzing all of the indicators in the risk groups that are presented in the EBA’s guidelines. However,
the assessment of systemic risk has been carried out in this study along with the main risk indicators.
To obtain a more accurate evaluation of each bank’s systemic risk level, the data from the crisis period
has been included, which comprises the data collected between 2008 and 2016. The annual deposit
insurance premiums for the deposit insurance fund are calculated separately for each individual bank
(See Formula (1)). While calculating the annual contributions of the banks, the correction coefficient
has not been included, because the introduction of this coefficient is significant when it is clear that the
fund size of the deposit insurance should be adjusted. However, in the first year after the introduction
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of a deposit insurance system, an adjustment coefficient should not be used. This coefficient should be
used when it is intended to ensure that the total annual contributions to the deposit guarantee system
are equal to 1/10th of the target level. Additionally, this adjustment coefficient must be the same across
all participating institutions in a given year. So, its introduction should not affect the assessment of a
risk-based deposit insurance system. This coefficient will raise or reduce the total amount of money
that the fund has collected, but will not contribute to the assessment of a bank’s risk.
The contribution rate, which should be the same across all state institutions in a given year, is
determined for the launch of a common E.U. deposit guarantee system. A specific amount in the
deposit insurance fund should be achieved in 10 years. Therefore, the allocation of the collection of
contributions to this fund should be done in as uniform a manner as possible, using amounts of the
premium rate. So, the amount in the deposit insurance fund has been specified each year, and has
been collected through the annual contributions of the members of the deposit insurance system. The
deposit guarantee system has not yet been launched, and a desirable amount of the deposit insurance
fund has not been provided. The study has been performed by calculating and evaluating the results
of the previous year, and the chosen contribution rate has been taken to be the same for all state
institutions in the period between 2012 and 2013.
In determining the aggregate risk weight of a bank (ARW), the risk indicator is determined
through the individual risk score of each bank, in accordance with the five categories of risk in the
European Banking Authority (EBA)’s guidelines (see Table 1). Individual risk scores for the indicators
have been determined by the grouping (bucketing) method. According to this method, the groups are
determined for each risk indicator by assigning the upper and lower limits for each group. For the
determination of the group rate’s limits, the absolute base is used when the limit of the group reflects
the riskiness of an index. In this case, institutions can fall into the same risk group when they have a
similar amount of riskiness. When determining the boundaries for the risk groups with the absolute
method, it is important to ensure that there is an appropriate and meaningful differentiation between
the members of the institution. The IRS points must be between 0 and 100, depending on the rate
of risk, where 0 represents the lowest risk value and 100 indicates the highest risk value. There are
three groups of indicators for each indicator in the study, in accordance with which the individual risk
score has been determined for each indicator (see Table 1). All risk indicators are divided into three
risk groups by quintiles (minimum risk, medium risk, and high risk), because a division into smaller
risk groups would not be reasonable. We implement the division of risk indicators by quintiles while
abiding by the EBA Guidelines (2015) as well the previous research that has been conducted by the
European Commission (European Commission 2009). The first quintile has been determined to be
from 0 to 33, the second from 34 to 66, and the third from 67 to 100.
While determining the individual risk scores of each of the risk indicators, each IRS value of an
indicator should be multiplied by the individual risk weight of each indicator:
IRSj =

0 if Aj > aj
100 if Aj < bj
aj − Aj
aj − bj if bj ≤ Aj ≤ aj
, where j = 1, . . . , n, (2)
where Aj is the risk indicator, IWj is the indicator weight, aj is the upper boundary, bj is the lower
boundary, and IRSj are the individual risk scores (EBA Guidelines 2015).
The received values have been summed using the arithmetic mean. Then, the aggregate risk score
(ARS) value is calculated by the following formula:
ARSj =
n
∑
j=1
IWj × IRSj (3)
where ∑nj=1 IWj = 100%.
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The weights of the same set of risk indicators should be used by all participating institutions.
Each of them accordingly receives an overall risk score, which should be used for the calculation of
the individual contributions of each bank. Aggregate risk weights groups could also be measured by
using the bucketing method, where the intervals of the ARS indicators show a respective risk class and
a relevant aggregate risk weights value. The number of ARW risk groups must be proportionate to the
number of member institutions and their diversity. However, the minimal possible number of risk
groups is 4 (see Table 2).
Table 1. The European Banking Authority’s risk indicators and groups of individual risk scores.
Groups of Risk Indicators Indicator Sign 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group
1
Capital ratio
individual risk
scores groups
Leverage ratio (Tier 1
Capital/Total Assets)
A higher value
indicates lower risk >0.11
≤0.11
<0.09 ≤0.09
CET1 ratio (Common
Equity Tier 1
Capital/Risk-Weighted
Assets)
A higher value
indicates better risk
mitigation
>0.19 ≤0.19<0.15 ≤0.15
2
Liquidity
indicator
individual risk
scores groups
Liquidity ratio
(Liquid Assets/Total
Assets) until the year
2014
A higher value
indicates lower risk >0.45
≤0.45
<0.39 ≤0.39
The Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (LCR)
calculation is defined
in the Regulation
from the year 2015
A higher value
indicates lower risk >264
≤264
<178 ≤178
3
Individual risk
scores groups of
non-performing
loans
NPL ratio
(Non-Performing
Loans/Total Loans)
A higher value
indicates higher risk ≤0.015
≤0.023
<0.015 >0.023
4
Individual risk
scores groups of
business model
and
management
indicators
Risk-Weighted Assets
(RWA)/Total assets
ratio (Risk-Weighted
Assets/Total Assets)
A higher value
indicates higher risk ≤0.52
≤0.68
<0.52 >0.68
Return on assets
(ROA) (Net
Income/Total Assets)
Negative values
indicate higher risk,
but values that are
too high could also
indicate high risk
≤0.87 ≤0.51<0.87
>0.51;
>1.84
5
Potential losses
on deposit
guarantee
systems of the
individual risk
scores
Unencumbered
assets/covered
deposits [(Total
Assets-Encumbered
Assets)/Covered
Deposits]
A higher value
indicates lower risk >1.35
≤1.35
<1.15 ≤1.15
Individual Risk Score (IRS) A higher valueindicates higher risk 0 50 100
Table 2. The aggregate risk weight groups and their values.
Risk Group/Risk Value ARS Value ARW Value
First group/low <40 75%
Second group/medium ≤40 <50 100%
Third group/high ≤50 <60 125%
Fourth group/very high ≥60 150%
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Each individual member institution should have a corresponding aggregate risk weight (ARWi)
value, which is used to calculate its contribution. The ARSi is translated into an aggregate risk weight
(ARWi) using the linear formula given below:
ARWi = β + (α − β) × ARSi/100 (4)
where α and β show the upper and lower boundaries, respectively.
There must be at least one risk group that shows the average risk that the banks face, at least
one risk group that shows low-risk institutions, and at least two risk groups that show high-risk
institutions. Based on that, the net stable funding ratio had not been calculated until 2015 (the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision adopted decisions on the final calculation of this indicator on
31 October 2014), and it is not included in the assessment of the riskiness of banks. According to
the European Banking Authority’s guidelines on the calculation of payments of contributions to the
deposit guarantee systems for the calculation methods (EBA Guidelines 2015), the net stable funding
ratio may be excluded from the calculation of risk-based premiums. However, its weight should be
reallocated to other indicators. The liquidity coverage ratio is not considered for the years 2012–2014,
but for the years 2015 and 2016 the liquidity coverage ratio is used instead of the liquidity ratio.
According to the EBA’s instructions (EBA Guidelines 2015), if additional risk indicators are not used,
the remaining 25% should be distributed among the categories (Model 1). Model 2, which determines
the individual weights of the main risk categories and indicators, is based on the abovementioned
minimum risk weights that have been indicated by the EBA, and the remaining 25% is attributed to the
systemic degree of risk, as the research that has been conducted by many scientists (Acharya et al. 2011;
Andries and Nistor 2016; Brownlees and Engle 2011, 2017; De Jonghe et al. 2015; Kanno 2015;
Laeven et al. 2014, 2016; Lee et al. 2015; Londono and Tian 2014; Oordt and Zhou 2015;
Varotto and Zhao 2014) has proven that this particular risk assessment and size have a great impact on
the stability of the overall financial system. According to the guidelines of the EBA, each additional
index weight must not exceed 15%, except for any additional indicators that are related to the
comprehensive assessment of the results of the risk profile and the management of the member
institution. Therefore, in the case of a systemic risk assessment, an additional risk category is
introduced, to which a higher risk weight can be attributed (see Table 3). It is noted that the assessment
of systemic risk is the introduction of an additional risk point, and the allocation of 25% to the systemic
risk indicator is compatible with the instructions of the EBA.
Table 3. Risk weights: Minimal, Model 1 and Model 2.
Risk Categories and Core Risk Indicators Minimal, % Model 1, % Model 2, %
1. Capital 18 24 18
1.1. Leverage ratio 9 12 9
1.2. CET1 9 12 9
2. Liquidity and funding 18 24 18
2.1. Liquidity ratio 18 24 18
3. Asset quality 13 18 13
3.1. NPL ratio 13 18 12
4. Business model and management 13 17 13
4.1. Risk-weighted assets (RWA) /Total assets ratio 6.5 8.5 6.5
4.2. Return on assets (ROA) 6.5 8.5 6.5
5. Potential losses for the DGS 13 17 13
5.1. Unencumbered assets / covered deposits 13 17 13
6. Systemic risk assessment - - 25
6.1. Systemic risk level in the institution - - 25
Total 75 100 100
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The systemic risk in Lithuania has been assessed using one of the newest systemic risk assessment
methods (Oordt and Zhou 2015), which assumes that banks’ shares are publicly traded on the stock
exchange. This method is based on the returns of the stock price and market capitalization, and the
systemic risk is assessed by the returns on the bank’s share price sensitivity to very large adverse
shocks in the financial system. Even though the method of Brownlees and Engle (2011) is one of
the most widely used systemic risk evaluation methods, and most authors adjust it to calculate an
institution’s systemic risk, the Oordt and Zhou (2015) method is very suitable for the case of Lithuania,
since a small number of banks are being assessed. Therefore, the model has been selected to make
possible a more accurate assessment of a small number of banks (there are only four banks whose
shares are publicly traded in Lithuania). However, this method is also suitable for a large number
of banks, because it can be used to construct banking system index, and the number of banks is not
limited. Besides, another advantage of applying Oordt and Zhou (2015) model in the case of Lithuania
is that it can avoid relatively large evaluation errors due to the low number of analyzed banks. This
method uses stock returns and market capitalizations data. In Oordt and Zhou (2015) systemic risk
evaluation method, a bank’s systemic risk level is calculated as the beta coefficient value according to
Formula (2):
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where ௝ܴ,௧ is the return of bank j’s shares on t day; and ௝݁,௧ିଵ is bank j’s market capitalization at the 
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largest fluctuations were recorded particularly during the crisis of 2008. Therefore, the analyzed 
period has been extended with the data from 2008 to 2009. Of the six banks operating in Lithuania, 
the shares of four are publicly traded on the stock market. However, the data on the shares of two of 
the banks are not available. The shares of JSC Citadele Bank are not publicly traded on any stock 
exchange, and one JSC Citadele Bank share belongs to an international group of investors, which is 
represented by “Ripplewood Advisors LLC”, and 12 other investors with a solid reputation, and the 
remaining 25% without one share are managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (Citadele Bank 2015). The shares of PLLC Medicinos Bank are not publicly traded on 
any stock exchange because it is a type of PLLC Bank. Therefore, it is not possible to estimate the 
systemic risk of JSC Citadele Bank and PLLC Medicinos Bank. PLLC Medicinos Bank and JSC 
Citadele Bank have been assigned in the study to the low systemic risk group (the attributed IRS 
value is 0). During the investigated period of 2012–2013, PLLC Medicinos Bank and JSC Citadele 
Bank had a 2.7–6.7 times lower guaranteed volume of deposits as compared to JSC Siauliu Bank, and 
a 17–21.8 times lower volume of deposits as compared to JSC Swedbank. The assets of PLLC 
Medicinos Bank and JSC Citadele Bank were also significantly lower during the period of the 
research. Thus, these banks have been classified as small banks in Lithuania. 
Avoiding any relatively high evaluation errors, due to the small number of analyzed banks, an 
index is composed for each bank from the Lithuanian banking system with the S−i  based on the four 
banks. The return of S−i is calculated according to the Formula (3): 
ܴௌష೔,௧೔ = 
∑ ௘ೕ	ಯ೔ ೕ,೟షభோೕ,೟
∑ ௘ೕ,೟షభೕಯ೔
 (6) 
where ௝ܴ,௧ is the return of bank j’s shares on t day; and ௝݁,௧ିଵ is bank j’s market capitalization at the 
end of the previous trading day. 
Systemic risk is measured considering the sensitivity of the bank to large shocks in the banking 
system of Lithuania. While performing VaR calculations (Andries and Nistor 2016; Brownlees and 
Engle 2011; Londono and Tian 2014), the 10% percentile is used, which shows the threshold at which 
each bank’s return is considered to be risky. During the period between 2008 and 2016, there were no 
major shocks in any of the analyzed banks, and the largest negative returns value reached up to 20%. 
It can be noted that the banking data are mostly distributed between the values of −5% and +5% and 
have big “tails”, and there were only a few days where the stock price had a fall that was bigger than 
−5%. The market capitalization data shows that JSC Swedbank had the largest market capitalization 
over the entire research period. So, the influence and significance of this bank has been the greatest 
and
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and one JSC Citadele Bank share belongs to an internatio l gr up of investors, which is represented
by “Ripplewood Advisors LLC”, and 12 other investors wi h a solid reput tion, and the remaining 25%
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Avoiding any relatively high evaluation errors, due to the small number of analyzed banks,
an index is composed for each bank from the Lithuanian banking system with the S−i based on the
four banks. The return of S−i is calculated according to the Formula (3):
RS−i ,ti =
∑j 6=i ej,t−1Rj,t
∑j 6=i ej,t−1
(6)
where Rj,t is the return of bank j’s shares on t day; and ej,t−1 is bank j’s market capitalization at the end
of the previous trading day.
Systemic risk is measured considering the sensitivity of the bank to large shocks in the
banking system of Lithuania. While performing VaR calculations (Andries and Nistor 2016;
Brownlees and Engle 2011; Londono and Tian 2014), the 10% percentile is used, which shows the
threshold at which each bank’s return is considered to be risky. During the period between 2008 and
2016, there were no major shocks in any of the analyzed banks, and the largest negative returns value
reached up to 20%. It can be noted that the banking data are mostly distributed between the values of
−5% and +5% and have big “tails”, and there were only a few days where the stock price had a fall
that was bigger than −5%. The market capitalization data shows that JSC Swedbank had the largest
market capitalization over the entire research period. So, the influence and significance of this bank
has been the greatest for the whole Lithuanian banking system. In second place, in terms of market
capitalization, was JSC SEB Bank, while JSC Siauliu Bank had the lowest market capitalization among
the four banks in question over the entire research period of 2008–2016.
After the determination of the ARW coefficients of each bank and the identification of the volume
of their insured deposits, a further step is to determine the size of the contribution rate. As has already
been mentioned in the section on the evaluation methodology, the contribution rate has no effect on
the identification of a bank’s risk, and it is used to ensure a certain level of deposit insurance fund
amount. However, the size of the contribution does not have a significant impact on the data analysis
of the previous year. The size of each bank’s contribution to the overall E.U. deposit insurance fund is
counted based on the basic calculation Formula (1).
To make a more accurate comparison of the contributions in the research for Model 1 and Model
2, a contribution rate of 0.45% size is applied. Such a size of the contribution rate is chosen to better
compare the differences between the annual contributions without a risk assessment and the previous
deposit insurance system of Lithuania and a common E.U. deposit insurance system. According to
the previous deposit insurance system of Lithuania, all commercial banks operating in Lithuania
had to pay 0.45% of the total amount of insured deposits (Deposit and Investment Insurance 2016).
This percentage was the same for all banks, regardless of the amount of risk they assume. To make
a comparison of the contributions, we calculated the relative change between the risk-based deposit
insurance contributions and the contributions made under the previous deposit insurance scheme of
Lithuania. Since litas was the Lithuanian currency until 2014, and since Lithuania became a member of
the E.U. in 2015, the contributions from 2012 to 2014 were translated from litas to euro in the ratio of
1 EUR being equal to 3.4528 litas.
4. Analysis of Results and Comments
To determine the overall risk score of each bank (ARS) and the comprehensive risk score, the
systemic risk of each bank is assessed, because the risk weights of individual indicators that are
applicable are different in Model 1 and Model 2, and the systemic risk is additionally included into
Model 2 (Lakstutiene et al. 2018). When performing the systemic risk assessment, the RS index of
Lithuanian banks was calculated, and the meaning of the k parameter was determined by the amended
random selection method (bootstrap). When determining 1000 random k values, the calculations shown
in Table 4 were used to obtain the meaning of the k values. The relatively low values of the calculated k
coefficients showed that Lithuanian banks do not have high stock return volatility and high risk. The
stock return histograms of Lithuanian banks for the years 2008–2016 are presented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Stock return histograms of Lithuanian banks for the years 2008–2016. 
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The evaluation showed the same results as the previous study (Lakstutiene et al. 2018); none of 
the four banks that operate in Lithuania have a large systemic risk level. The low beta coefficient 
values were mostly determined by low k coefficients. K coefficient changes have a great effect on the 
beta coefficient values, and a small amount of negative equity returns affected the low k coefficient 
values. Even in 2008, during the financial crisis, when the stock prices fell the most, there were only 
a few significant negative equity return values. JSC Swedbank and JSC SEB Bank can be distinguished 
from the other banks on the basis of the obtained beta coefficient values. 
Figure 2 shows the beta coefficient sensitivity analysis to the VaR parameter. The sensitivity 
analysis with different VaR percentiles (5%, 10% and 15%) showed the same results for JSC Swedbank 
and JSC SEB Bank; in all cases, they had higher systemic risk than the other banks.  
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The evaluation showed the same results as the previous study (Lakstutiene et al. 2018); none
of the four banks that operate in Lithuania have a large systemic risk level. The low beta coefficient
values were mostly determined by low k coefficients. K coefficient changes have a great effect on the
beta coefficient values, and a small amount of negative equity returns affected the low k coefficient
values. Even in 2008, during the financial crisis, when the stock prices fell the most, there were only a
few significant negative equity return values. JSC Swedbank and JSC SEB Bank can be distinguished
from the other banks on the basis of the obtained beta coefficient values.
Figure 2 shows the beta coefficient sensitivity analysis to the VaR parameter. The sensitivity
analysis with different VaR percentiles (5%, 10% and 15%) showed the same results for JSC Swedbank
and JSC SEB Bank; in all cases, they had higher systemic risk than the other banks.
Risks 2018, 6, 137 14 of 21
Risks 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW  14 of 21 
 
 
Figure 2. Beta coefficient sensitivity analysis to the VaR parameter. 
Although neither of the banks had a high systemic risk level, as assessed by the average systemic 
risk value, JSC Swedbank and JSC SEB Bank had a significantly higher systemic risk level than JSC 
DNB Bank and JSC Siauliu Bank. The results were partly determined by the larger market 
capitalizations of JSC Swedbank and JSC SEB Bank when compared to the other banks in the 
Lithuanian market. However, the stock returns of JSC SEB Bank had greater volatility, which implied 
that the systemic risk of JSC SEB Bank was slightly higher than that of JSC Swedbank. Therefore, JSC 
Swedbank and JSC SEB Bank were classified as medium systemic risk banks (respectively assigned 
an IRS value of 50), and JSC DNB Bank and JSC Siauliu Bank were classified as the lowest systemic 
risk banks (an IRS value of 0). The same systemic risk results were obtained when evaluating the 
period 2008–2014 (Lakstutiene et al. 2018). Based on the established risk indicators of the individual 
risk point values and the weights of the individual risk indicators provided (see Table 3), the overall 
risk score value was calculated for each bank as per Model 1 and Model 2 (see Table 5). 
Table 5. The average risk score (ARS) excluding systemic risk (Model 1) and including systemic risk 
(Model 2). 
ARS Model 1  
Year JSC SEB Bank 
JSC DNB 
Bank 
JSC 
Swedbank 
PLLC Medicinos Bank JSC Citadele Bank JSC Siauliu Bank 
2012 83.00 51.75 38.50 58.50 29.00 51.25 
2013 64.25 65.00 59.00 61.50 39.25 71.75 
2014 48.00 53.00 47.00 53.75 41.75 67.50 
2015 27.00 44.50 29.50 68.75 70.50 54.25 
2016 33.00 41.50 50.00 43.50 80.75 45.25 
ARS Model 2  
2012 74.5 38.75 41 44 22 38.75 
2013 60.25 48.5 56.5 46.5 29.75 53.75 
2014 48 40 47.5 40.75 31.75 50.5 
2015 32.5 33.5 34.5 51.75 53 40.75 
2016 37 31 50 33 60.75 34.25 
The ARS values in the Model 1 and Model 2 cases show the different risk volumes that banks 
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determined risk scores meanings according to the methodology. 
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JSC SEB Bank were classified as medium systemic risk banks (respectively a signed an IRS value of
50), and JSC DNB Bank and JSC Siauliu Bank were classified as the lowest systemic risk bank (an IRS
value of 0). The same systemic risk results were obtain d when evaluati g the period 2008–2014
(Lakstutiene et al. 2018). Based on the established risk indicators of the individual risk point al es
and the weights of the indiv dual risk indicators provide (see Table 3), the overall risk score alue
was calculated for ea h bank as per Model 1 and Model 2 (see Table 5).
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ARS odel 1
Year JSC SEBank
JSC DNB
Bank
JSC
Swedbank
PLLC
Medicinos
Bank
JSC
Citadele
Bank
JSC Siauliu
Bank
2012 83.00 51.75 38.50 58.50 29.00 51.25
2013 64.25 65.00 59.00 61.50 39.25 71.75
2014 48.00 53.0 47.00 53.75 41.75 67. 0
2015 27.00 44.50 29.50 68.75 70.50 54.25
2016 33.00 41.50 50.00 43.50 80.75 45.25
ARS Model 2
2012 74.5 38.75 41 44 22 38.75
2013 60.25 48.5 56.5 46.5 29.75 53.75
2014 48 40 47.5 40.75 31.75 50.5
2015 32.5 33.5 34.5 51.75 53 40.75
2016 37 31 50 33 60.75 34.25
The ARS values in the Model 1 and Model 2 cases show the different risk volumes that banks
assume, which, during the period of 2012–2016, varied significantly across all banks of Lithuania. Each
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of the banks was assigned an aggregate risk weight (see Table 6), and received common determined
risk scores meanings according to the methodology.
Table 6. The aggregate risk weight (ARW) excluding systemic risk (Model 1) and including systemic
risk (Model 2).
ARW Model 1
Year JSC SEBBank
JSC DNB
Bank
JSC
Swedbank
PLLC
Medicinos
Bank
JSC
Citadele
Bank
JSC Siauliu
Bank
2012 1.5 1.25 0.75 1.25 0.75 1.25
2013 1.5 1.5 1.25 1.5 0.75 1.5
2014 1 1.25 1 1.25 1 1.5
2015 0.75 1 0.75 1.5 1.5 1.25
2016 0.75 1 1.25 1 1.5 1
ARW Model 2
2012 1.5 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.75
2013 1.5 1 1.25 1 0.75 1.25
2014 1 1 1 1 0.75 1.25
2015 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.25 1.25 1
2016 0.75 0.75 1.25 0.75 1.5 0.75
The obtained ARW results show the different bank risk values without evaluating systemic risk
(Model 1) and evaluating systemic risk (Model 2). According to Model 1, over the entire research period,
the riskiest banks can be considered to be PLLC Medicinos Bank and JSC Siauliu Bank, whose aggregate
risk weights over the entire period were the highest. The riskiness of JSC Siauliu Bank, compared with
2012, increased during 2013 to 2014, which was mainly due to an increase in the capital risk indicators
and a reduction in the rate of unencumbered assets and guaranteed deposits. It was determined that
only in the case of JSC SEB Bank did the comprehensive risk score values of both Model 1 and Model 2
completely coincide. After assessing the systemic risk (Model 2), JSC Swedbank and JSC SEB Bank were
assigned to the medium-risk group. All of the other banks that operate in Lithuania were attributed to
the lowest risk groups. According to Model 2, the least risky bank during the years 2012–2014 was JSC
Citadele Bank, whose aggregate risk weight during 2012 to 2014 fell into the lowest risk category. This
has also been confirmed by the research results of Laeven et al. (2014, 2016) and De Jonghe et al. (2015).
However, in 2015, JSC Citadele Bank had quite a low liquidity coverage ratio and a higher NPL ratio,
which influenced it to have a higher risk-taking level. According to Model 2, the least risky banks in the
period 2015–2016 were JSC SEB Bank and JSC DNB Bank. The riskiest of all banks, according to Model
2, can be considered to be JSC Swedbank and JSC SEB Bank, whose average values of aggregate risk
weights for the years 2012–2016 were the highest. The obtained systemic risk results confirm the research
results of Laeven et al. (2014, 2016), De Jonghe et al. (2015), Lee et al. (2015), and Black et al. (2016),
suggesting that systemic risk depends on the size of the bank, and that the major banks are riskier.
In determining the aggregate risk weights, according to Formula (1), each bank’s annual contribution to
the E.U. deposit insurance fund was calculated. The calculated annual contributions to the overall size of
the E.U. deposit insurance fund during the period of 2012–2016 in the banks of Lithuania are presented
in Table 7.
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Table 7. The setting of sizes of annual contributions in Lithuanian banks excluding systemic risk
(Model 1) and including systemic risk (Model 2) in thousands of EUR.
Model 1
Year JSC SEBBank
JSC DNB
Bank
JSC
Swedbank
PLLC
Medicinos
Bank
JSC
Citadele
Bank
JSC
Siauliu
Bank
Total
2012 24.228 9.826 14.482 1.162 801 3.598 54.097
2013 25.894 12.539 24.335 1.383 773 9.015 73.941
2014 20.138 12.057 22.482 1.216 1.513 9.674 67.081
2015 16.114 10.835 18.265 1.453 2.390 8.158 57.214
2016 17.421 11.431 36.439 1.049 3.030 7.001 76.370
Model 2
2012 24.228 5.896 19.309 929 801 2.159 53.322
2013 25.894 8.359 24.335 922 773 7.513 67.797
2014 20.138 9.646 22.482 973 1.135 8.061 62.435
2015 16.114 8.126 18.265 1.211 1.992 6.526 52.234
2016 17.421 8.573 36.439 787 3.030 5.251 71.500
Analyzing the annual contribution rates, according to Model 1 and Model 2, JSC SEB Bank would
have had to make the biggest contributions for the years 2012–2013, and JSC Swedbank would have
had to make the biggest contributions for the years 2014–2016. This is due to the high volume of
guaranteed deposits and the sufficiently large aggregate risk weights taken by these banks, which
accepted a higher than average risk. The minimum contributions to the overall E.U. deposit insurance
system would have been paid to JSC Citadele Bank and PLLC Medicinos Bank in 2012 to 2016 in both
Model 1 and Model 2. During the period of 2012–2016, JSC Citadele Bank had a higher volume of
deposits guaranteed than did PLLC Medicinos Bank. However, due to the smaller aggregate risk
weight, the contributions of JSC Citadele Bank in 2012 to 2013 to the common E.U. deposit insurance
system would be lower. The increase in the size of JSC Siauliu Bank’s contributions in 2013 when
compared to 2012 was mainly due to the guaranteed deposits being doubled.
The results on minimum payments are very similar between Model 2 and Model 1. JSC Citadele
Bank would have had to make the smallest contribution for the years 2012–2013, and PLLC Medicinos
Bank would have had to make the smallest contribution for the years 2014–2016. After calculating
the deposit insurance premiums in Model 2, the aggregate risk weights of JSC DNB Bank, JSC Siauliu
Bank, JSC Citadele Bank, and PLLC Medicinos Bank during the period under review were found to be
lower than the values from Model 1, because the systemic risk of these banks resulted in these banks
being assigned to the lowest-risk groups. Examining the total annual contribution size of all banks
operating in Lithuania, it was determined in both Model 1 and Model 2 that the largest amount of
contributions made during the period under consideration would have been in 2016. The comparison
of the deposit insurance premiums of the banks operating in Lithuania, according to the previous
deposit insurance system of Lithuania (without risk assessment) and according to Model 1 and Model
2, is presented in Table 8.
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Table 8. A comparison of the Deposit Insurance Fund contributions of Lithuanian banks from Model 1 and Model 2.
Year Models and Premiums JSC SEBBank
JSC DNB
Bank
JSC
Swedbank
PLLC
Medicinos
Bank
JSC
Citadele
Bank
JSC Siauliu
Bank Total
2012
Without risk contribution, thousands of EUR 16.152 7.861 19.309 929 1.068 2.879 48.198
Contributions according to Model 1, thousands of EUR 24.228 9.826 14.482 1.162 801 3.598 54.097
Change according to Model 1 50.00% 25.00% −25.00% 25.00% −25.00% 25.00% 12.24%
Contributions according to Model 2, thousands of EUR 24.228 5.896 19.309 929 801 2.159 53.322
Change according to Model 2 50.00% −25.00% 0.00% 0.00% −25.00% −25.00% 10.63%
2013
Without risk contribution, thousands of EUR 17.263 8.359 19.468 922 1.031 6.010 53.054
Contributions according to Model 1, thousands of EUR 25.894 12.539 24.335 1.383 773 9.015 73.941
Change according to Model 1 50.00% 50.00% 25.00% 50.00% −25.00% 50.00% 39.37%
Contributions according to Model 2, thousands of EUR 25.894 8.359 24.335 922 773 7.513 67.797
Change according to Model 2 50.00% 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% −25.00% 25.00% 27.79%
2014
Without risk contribution, thousands of EUR 20.138 9.646 22.482 973 1.513 6.449 61.201
Contributions according to Model 1, thousands of EUR 20.138 12.057 22.482 1.216 1.513 9.674 67.081
Change according to Model 1 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 50.00% 9.61%
Contributions according to Model 2, thousands of EUR 20.138 9.646 22.482 973 1.135 8.061 62.435
Change according to Model 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% −25.00% 25.00% 2.02%
2015
Without risk contribution, thousands of EUR 21.485 10.835 24.353 969 1.593 6.526 65.761
Contributions according to Model 1, thousands of EUR 16.114 10.835 18.265 1.453 2.390 8.158 57.214
Change according to Model 1 −25.00% 0.00% −25.00% 50.00% 50.00% 25.00% −13.00%
Contributions according to Model 2, thousands of EUR 16.114 8.126 18.265 1.211 1.992 6.526 52.234
Change according to Model 2 −25.00% −25.00% −25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 0.00% −20.57%
2016
Without risk contribution, thousands of EUR 23.228 11.431 29.151 1.049 2.020 7.001 73.880
Contributions according to Model 1, thousands of EUR 17.421 11.431 36.439 1.049 3.030 7.001 76.370
Change according to Model 1 −25.00% 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 3.37%
Contributions according to Model 2, thousands of EUR 17.421 8.573 36.439 787 3.030 5.251 71.500
Change according to Model 2 −25.00% −25.00% 25.00% −25.00% 50.00% −25.00% −3.22%
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Evaluating the overall contributions of all banks in Model 1 and Model 2, the total amount of
contributions made during 2012 to 2014 would have been higher when compared to the previous
contributions (without risk assessment). In 2015, on the contrary, banks had to make lower
contributions in comparison without risk assessment contributions. Under Model 1, banks generally
would have made larger contributions over the entire period than under Model 2. The obtained
differences between the results under Model 1 and Model 2, when assessing the general amount of
contributions of all banks, were not large and differed by up to 10%. It is important to note that the
total amount of contributions made can be adjusted by introducing into the calculation an adjustment
coefficient to collect the target deposit insurance fund for a longer period. The differences between the
contributions under Model 1 and Model 2 were lower in the major banks of Lithuania: JSC Swedbank
and JSC SEB Bank. In most cases, the contributions by the largest Lithuanian banks coincided in both
models. The differences between the results under Model 1 and Model 2 of the remaining Lithuanian
banks were larger. In all cases of Model 1, the other banks (JSC DNB Bank, PLLC Medicinos Bank,
JSC Citadele Bank, and JSC Siauliu Bank) would have had to make larger or the same contributions to
the deposit insurance fund than in the case of Model 2. Most of these differences were caused by the
fact that the systemic risk in all of the minor banks and JSC DNB Bank resulted in these banks being
assigned to the lowest-risk group, and the systemic risk individual risk weight being 25%. Therefore,
influence of the systemic risk on the aggregate risk score was significant.
In summary, it can be stated that the assessment of systemic risk, in the case of Lithuania, would
redistribute the deposit insurance premiums among the banks. However, the analysis showed that
only the two largest Lithuanian banks, Swedbank and SEB Bank, have a slightly higher systemic risk
in comparison to the other banks operating in Lithuania. This leads to the insight that in the case of
Lithuanian banks, systemic risk should be given less individual risk weight to not reduce the influence
of the other risk indicators. The research showed that the total difference in contributions between
the two models of evaluation was not very large. However, the inclusion of systemic risk helps to
form a more accurate assessment of a bank’s risk, allows us to go beyond the assessment of basic risk
indicators, and suggests that the measurement of systemic risk is a value-adding process.
5. Conclusions
When evaluating the risks of all six banks that operate in Lithuania, each indicator had been
attributed to low-, medium-, or high-risk groups. The obtained results showed that, when performing
the assessment with the two risk-based models (Model 1 excluding systemic risk, and Model 2
including systemic risk) during the period 2012–2014, the total amount of the deposit insurance fund
would have been higher than without a risk assessment (i.e., under the previous deposit insurance
system of Lithuania). The largest increase in total contributions, under Model 1, was found to reach
39.37% in 2013. The situation would have been the opposite in 2015 and 2016, where the total amount
of contributions would have been lower under Model 2 as compared with the previous system in
Lithuania, when in Model 1 contributions would have been lower in 2015 but higher in 2016. It is
noted that, in the major Lithuanian banks JSC Swedbank and JSC SEB Bank, the risk assessment
carried out under both evaluation models was very similar. However, the differences between Model
1 and Model 2 for the smaller banks were larger. The research results of Laeven et al. (2014, 2016),
De Jonghe et al. (2015), Lee et al. (2015), and Black et al. (2016) also confirmed that smaller banks have
less systemic risk and no significant impact on other market participants, and vice versa: Major banks
are riskier. The results show that, after the introduction of a risk-based deposit insurance system,
according to Model 1 and Model 2, and as compared to the previous system in Lithuania (without
a risk assessment), the largest contribution increase of an individual bank would be +50% percent,
and the largest decrease would be −25%.
The results showed that, during the period under consideration, only JSC Swedbank and JSC SEB
Bank fell into the medium groups of systemic risk, while all the other banks operating in Lithuania
were attributed to the low systemic risk group. The introduction of a risk-assessment-based deposit
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insurance system and the redistribution of deposit insurance premiums among the banks operating
in Lithuania would, thus, contribute to the mitigation of negative deposit insurance system impacts
and an improvement in the stability of the financial system. Without the assessment of systemic risk,
a deposit insurance fund ignores the interconnections among banks and does not ensure that the
banking system will have adequate stability. Since the study found that systemic risk inclusion has
a positive influence on a common E.U. deposit insurance system, further studies should examine
what results would be obtained in other E.U. countries, and what should be the optimum weight
of the systemic risk indicator in a common E.U. deposit insurance system. The introduction of a
risk-assessment-based common E.U. deposit insurance system would contribute to the enhancement
of financial stability in the overall E.U. banking sector. So, the benefits to the introduction of this
system are undeniable. In summary, the study provides an insight that the introduction of a systemic
risk indicator will help to provide a more accurate assessment of a bank’s risk, that systemic risk
assessment is a value-adding process to the identification of a bank’s risk, and that it is not limited
only to the risk assessment of the indicators of individual banks. So, we recommend that systemic risk
evaluation be included in the common E.U. risk-based deposit insurance system.
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